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This paper deals with second-best pollution taxation by investigating
allocations instead of the corresponding tax rates. Assuming certain restric-
tions on utility and that the marginal revenue from environmental taxation
is positive, it is shown that environmental quality is higher in second best
where only distortionary taxes are used to ﬁnance public expenditures than
in the ﬁrst-best optimum where lump-sum taxes are available.
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According to the double-dividend hypothesis proposed by Terkla (1984), Lee and
Misiolek (1986), and Oates (1993) in a partial equilibrium framework, a pollu-
tion tax not only improves the environment (ﬁrst dividend), but also generates
public funds such that the excess burden of other taxes can be reduced (second
dividend). Consequently, the second-best tax on dirty activities should exceed
the Pigouvian tax which fully internalizes the marginal social damage from pol-
lution. While these two statements are by no means equivalent, most work on the
‘double-dividend debate’ has dealt with the second claim which is more interest-
ing from a policy perspective.1 This claim has been investigated by comparing the
ﬁrst-order conditions which determine the optimal pollution tax in ﬁrst best and
second best respectively. The subsequent analysis complements this literature by
asking whether environmental quality is higher in second best than in ﬁrst best.
Hence, the present paper concentrates on the second-best allocation rather than
on second-best prices.
In an important contribution, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) have criticized
the partial equilibrium analyses by investigating a general equilibrium model with
wage taxation. They show that the second-best pollution tax can be below the
social marginal damage of pollution. Two intuitive arguments for this result have
been given. The ﬁrst one refers to the crowding-out argument of Pigou (1947),
namely that the indirect welfare costs of taxation lead to a lower level of public
good provision in second best than in ﬁrst best:2 “high costs of public funds crowd
out not only ordinary public consumption, but also the collective good of the
environment” (Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), p. 1088). According to another
argument, the second-best pollution tax is rather low because the wage tax does
in itself improve the environment since it reduces employment and labor income
of which part is spend on dirty goods (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), p.
1The claim concerning the optimal pollution tax means that the additional excess burden
created by a revenue neutral environmental tax reform is lower in the presence of other distor-
tionary taxes than with lump-sum taxation. The double-dividend hypothesis, however, means
that this additional excess burden is negative, which is a stronger requirement: It implies that
the environmental tax reform increases welfare even if the disutility from pollution is ignored
(see e.g. Sandmo (2000, Chap. 6) for a discussion). Note that the present paper concentrates
on the second-best optimum where the second dividend must be negative by assumption.
2See Atkinson and Stern (1974) for a prominent discussion of this topic. An overview of
more recent ﬁndings can be found in Gaube (2000, 2005).
1351). That is, the wage tax implies less pollution than the lump-sum tax in a
baseline situation with no pollution levy. Hence, even if the costs of achieving
additional reductions in pollution are higher in the presence of wage taxation
than in the presence of lump-sum taxation, the optimal amount of environmental
quality can still be higher in second best than in ﬁrst best.3 The ﬁrst argument
identiﬁes a low pollution tax with a low level of environmental quality, whereas
the second argument explains a low pollution tax by pointing out that the wage
tax already serves as an indirect method for preserving the environment. These
explanations thus do not clarify whether the entire tax system eventually leads
to more or less environmental protection. Moreover, Fullerton (1997) and Sch¨ ob
(1997) have shown that the optimal pollution tax can exceed the Pigouvian tax
if additional expenditures are ﬁnanced by a consumption tax instead of a wage
tax. Since a switch from wage taxation to consumption taxation is just a matter
of price normalization, these ﬁndings show that one should carefully distinguish
between second-best tax rates and the corresponding allocation.4
For that reason, I deal with quantities instead of prices. The analysis is framed
in terms of the crowding-out hypothesis mentioned above: I ask whether environ-
mental quality and government provision of an ordinary public good is higher or
lower in second best than in ﬁrst best, i.e. whether distortionary taxation leads
to more or less provision of collective goods than lump-sum taxation. Assum-
ing certain restrictions on utility, it is shown that providing less of the public
good corresponds to providing more environmental quality than in ﬁrst best (as
long as the marginal revenue of environmental taxation is positive). This ﬁnd-
ing points to a dissimilarity between environmental quality and ordinary public
goods: While ordinary public goods are provided by spending public revenue, an
increase in environmental quality is achieved by imposing a tax that generates
public revenues. If the costs of raising public funds are increased because a lump-
sum tax is replaced by distortionary taxes, expenditures on ordinary public goods
become more costly, whereas revenues (from environmental protection) become
more valuable from a social point of view. Therefore, distortionary taxes provide
3Second-best environmental quality can thus exceed ﬁrst-best environmental quality al-
though pollution abatement (i.e. the diﬀerence between pollution in the baseline situation and
with optimal environmental taxation) should be lower in a second-best world than with lump-
sum taxes. See also Bovenberg and Goulder (1996, 2002) for a discussion of these arguments.
4This point has been emphasized also in Sandmo (2000, Chap. 6.4).
2more room for environmental protection than lump-sum taxes.5
As noted above, little attention has been given to the analysis of the second-
best allocation. Metcalf (2003) also deals with quantities and asks how an exoge-
nous increase in public good provision aﬀects taxes and the level of environmental
quality. It is shown that an increase in public good provision can lead to an in-
crease in environmental quality even though the pollution tax is decreasing. This
result also emphasizes the distinction between prices and quantities but leaves
open the question whether distortionary taxes aﬀect the optimal level of environ-
mental quality in a diﬀerent way than lump-sum taxes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. In Section 3, the link between tax rates and the corresponding quantities is
discussed. The crowding-out hypothesis is investigated in Section 4 for a speciﬁc
class of utility functions, and in Section 5 from a more general perspective. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of N identical households who consume a clean private
commodity (C), a dirty private commodity (D), leisure (V ), environmental qual-
ity (E), and a public good (G). Each household has an endowment of one unit
of leisure and maximizes a strictly quasiconcave utility function U(C,D,V,E,G)
which is monotonically increasing in all arguments.
The commodities C,D,a n dG can be produced by means of a linear tech-
nology using labor L := (1 − V ) as the only input of production. The rates of
transformation between C,D,a n dG are normalized to unity. These assumptions
imply that the production frontier (expressed in per capita terms) can be written
in the form
h(1 − V ) − C − D − G/N =0 , (1)
where the parameter h represents the constant productivity of labor. Environ-
mental quality E is negatively aﬀected by the total amount ND of the dirty
5In the simplest version of the model analyzed below, environmental quality is higher in
second best than in ﬁrst best if and only if the marginal revenue of the pollution tax is positive.
Hence, the ﬁnding that distortionary taxes can lead to a higher level of environmental protection
does not hinge on the fact that a wage tax reduces labor income relative to lump-sum taxation.
3commodity. This assumption is formalized by means of
E = e(ND),e
 (ND) < 0. (2)
The households take the prices pC,p D,p L of the commodities C,D,L as well
as the quantities G, E as given. Each agent maximizes utility U(C,D,V,E,G)
with respect to C,D,V subject to the budget constraint
pL(1 − V ) − pCC − pDD =0 ,
where pL = h(1−tL), pC =1+tC,a n dpD =1+tD.T h ev a r i a b l e stC,t D,a n dtL
stand for the tax rates imposed on private consumption C, D, and labor income
h(1 − V ) respectively.6
The households’ maximization problem leads to the demand functions
C(pC,p D,p L,E,G), D(pC,p D,p L,E,G), V (pC,p D,p L,E,G), and the labor sup-
ply function L(pC,p D,p L,E,G)=1− V (pC,p D,p L,E,G). The indirect utility
function is denoted by W(pC,p D,p L,E,G).
The welfare maximizing government chooses the tax rates tC,t D,t L,a n dt h e
quantity G subject to the budget constraint
tCC + tDD + tLh(1 − V ) − G/N =0 ( 3 )
and the externality constraint (2). Since the households are identical, the opti-








S): =a r g m a x
tC,tD,tL,G{W(pC,p D,p L,E,G) | (2),(3)}. (4)
For any solution to (4) there exists a corresponding second-best allocation
(CS,D S,VS,ES,G S) which will be compared with the ﬁrst-best optimum. The
latter is obtained by maximizing the utility function U(C,D,V,E,G) subject to






F): =a r g m a x
C,D,V,E,G{U(C,D,V,E,G) | (1),(2)}. (5)
The subsequent analysis refers to the question whether GS and ES exceed or fall
short of the ﬁrst-best quantities GF and EF.
6Since consumer prices are deﬁned as the sum of producer prices and tax rates, the producer
price of commodity C (or D) is normalized to unity here. Hence, the gross wage rate is equal
to h.
7Taken together, the budget constraints of the individuals and of the government imply the
resource constraint (1). Therefore, this constraint is redundant in the second-best context.
43 Comparisons
As noted in the introductory section, previous analyses of the second-best prob-
lem (4) have not been concerned with the diﬀerence between the quantities ES
and EF, but have asked whether the second-best tax rate tS
D exceeds the Pigou-
vian tax τ which fully internalizes the marginal social damage from pollution.
The Pigouvian tax can be determined by means of the ﬁrst-order conditions cor-
responding to (5). These conditions imply8

















=1 ( 7 )
where UK denotes the partial derivative of the utility function U(·) with respect
to K ∈{ C,D,V,E,G}. The equations in (6) are satisﬁed if the two tax rates tC
and tL are set equal to zero, and tD is set equal to the marginal damage imposed
by the dirty commodity D, i.e.




where λ denotes the marginal utility of income.9 Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)
argue that the second-best tax rate tS
D may be lower than the Pigouvian rate τ.
More speciﬁcally, they show
Proposition 1: [Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)] Choose the normalization tC =
0 and assume U(C,D,V,E,G)=˜ U(Q(M(C,D),V),E,G) where M(C,D) is
homothetic. If tS
L > 0, and if the wage elasticity of labor supply is positive, then
tS
D <τ.
At ﬁrst sight, the inequality tS
D <τindicates less provision of environmental
quality in second best than in ﬁrst-best. However, the examination of a single
nominal tax rate does not suﬃce for a determination of the second-best allocation.
This becomes clear by the analysis of Fullerton (1997) and Sch¨ ob (1997). They
8The equations in (6) and (7) are the Samuelson conditions for the commodities E and G
respectively. Note that one of these four equations is redundant. For future reference, however,
all Samuelson conditions are called into atttention.
9With the taxes tC = tL =0w eh a v eλ = UC = UV /h, UD/UC =1+tD,a n dUD/UV =
(1 + tD)/h. Hence, (8) is equivalent to (6).
5argue that the conclusion tS
D <τhinges on the chosen normalization tC =0 .
Denoting the government’s tax revenue by
R := tCC + tDD + tLh(1 − V ),
their ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.10


























< 0( 9 )
then tS
D >τ.
It should be noted that the normalizations tC =0a n dtL = 0 aﬀect only
prices, but not the second-best allocation from (4). Therefore, Propositions 1 and
2 reﬂect a general feature of tax-models ﬁrst discussed by Mirrlees (1976):11 Any
feasible allocation can be implemented by a manifold of tax vectors (tC,t D,t L)
where the sign of each tax rate can be positive or negative depending on the choice
of the untaxed good. Fullerton (1997) and Sch¨ ob (1997) note that the choice of the
untaxed good eventually determines the relative price under consideration. This
point can be made explicit by analyzing the allocative consequences of Propo-
sitions 1 and 2, i.e by reformulating the two results in terms of the household’s
marginal rates of substitution.12
Remark: (a) If tC is normalized to zero, then tS
D <τmeans that
UD + Ne UE
UC
< 1. (10)
holds in second best. (b) If tL is normalized to zero, then tS
D >τmeans that






holds in second best.
10Proposition 2 restates Fullerton’s result (p. 247). He assumes that a revenue neutral tax
reform has opposing eﬀects on the quantities C and D. This assumption is formalized here by
means of the inequality (9). Sch¨ ob (1997) makes a similar point, but refers to the welfare eﬀect
of a tax reform at some initial point tD = tC which is not second best.
11See p. 331. For an extension of the argument see also Guesnerie (1995), p. 79.
12Note that tC = 0 implies λ = UC and UD/UC =1+tD,w h e r e a stL = 0 implies λ = UV /h
and UD/UV =( 1+tD)/h. Using these results, the proof of the remark is straightforward.
6This remark points out that Propositions 1 and 2 refer to diﬀerent marginal
rates of substitution or, equivalently, diﬀerent relative prices. While Proposition
1 shows that the tax diﬀerential between the commodities D and C can be lower
in second best than in ﬁrst best, Proposition 2 indicates that the tax diﬀerential
between commodities the D and V is higher in second best than in ﬁrst best.13
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) argue that the ratio pD/pC is more relevant for the
evaluation of real-world tax systems than the ratio pD/pL because wage taxation
plays a greater role than commodity taxation in practice. However, if one tries
to analyze the eﬀect of distortionary taxes on the optimal level of environmental
quality, both relative prices (i.e. tax diﬀerentials) are of equal importance.
4 The Crowding-Out Hypothesis Revisited
The intuitive argument provided in the introductory section points to a dissimi-
larity between environmental quality and ordinary public goods. It refers to the
fact that the provision of ordinary public goods raises public expenditures, while
the provision of environmental quality raises public revenue. In order to work out
this dissimilarity most clearly, I will restrain the analysis to a simple preference
structure described by
U(C,D,V,E,G)=M(C,D)+V + B(G)+H(E), (12)
where the functions M(C,D),B(G), and H(E) are assumed to be strictly con-
cave. For simplicity, I will also assume e  (ND)=0 . 14 Clearly, the assumptions
underlying (12) are rather restrictive. The ﬁndings of this section will thus be
discussed from a more general perspective below in Section 5.
The utility function (12) has several notable properties. First, it is consistent
with the assumptions made in Proposition 1: The assumption of weak separability
between (C,D,V)a n d( E,G) has been strengthened here to additive separabil-
ity. Moreover, I assume that private utility Q(M(C,D),V) is quasilinear. Note,
however, that these assumptions ensure a positive wage elasticity of labor supply
(required in Proposition 1) as long as M(C,D) is homogeneous (also required in
13Clearly, the inequalities (10) and (11) do not depend on the tax normalization. Hence, if
(10) holds for the case tC = 0, it must hold for any other normalization as well. This observation
is closely related to the ﬁndings of Williams (2001).
14It should be noted that the subsequent results still hold as long as e  (·) < 0. In a situation
with e  (·) > 0, however, the government’s maximization problem may not be concave.
7Proposition 1).15 Second, the function (12) allows for a straightforward compar-
ison between the quantities GS and GF. This feature is due to the quasilinear
structure of the utility function and is essential here since earlier contributions
on the link between government provision of a public good and distortionary tax-
ation (see Gaube (2000, 2005) for an overview) cannot directly be applied to an
economy with externalities.16 Third, (12) contains the partial equilibrium model
analyzed by Terkla (1984), Lee and Misiolek (1986), and Oates (1993) as a spe-
cial case. This allows us to investigate whether the general equilibrium eﬀects of
environmental taxation which have been emphasized by Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1994) can be expressed also in terms of the partial equilibrium framework.
Consider now the second-best problem (4) and assume (12). Normalizing tL
to zero and substituting (2) into W(pC,p D,p L,E,G), the ﬁrst-order conditions





















G : UG − µ/N =0 , (15)
where µ denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s budget







































15Since this claim can easily be veriﬁed no formal proof is provided.
16Note that (12) implies neutrality of the public good G. Therefore, these preferences are
close to a prominent example of second-best public good provision presented by Atkinson and
Stern (1974).
17The ﬁrst-order conditions (13) - (15) can easily be derived by employing the following
properties: First, note that separability between (C,D,V )a n d( E,G) implies that the demand
functions C(·)a n dD(·) are independent of E and G. Second, Roy’s identity, i.e. ∂W/∂tC = −Cλ
and ∂W/∂tD = −Dλ is used. Since the normalization tL = 0 and the quasilinearity of (12)
leads to λ = UV /h =1 /h,w et h u sh a v e∂W/∂tC = −C/h and ∂W/∂tD = −D/h.
8Because of (6), (8), and UV = 1, the ﬁrst-best allocation (5) can be implemented
by means of the prices pF
L = h, pF



























Furthermore, due to the quasilinear preferences (12), D(·)a n dC(·)a r eH i c k s i a n
demand functions. Hence, the symmetry of the Slutzky matrix implies ∂C/∂tD =






























where the derivatives UF
E and US
E refer to ﬁrst best and second best respectively.
The equations (13), (15), and (17) will now be used for a comparison between
the quantities GS,G F and ES,EF. I will start with the simplest version of the
model where cross price eﬀects between the two taxed commodities are assumed
to be negligible, i.e. ∂C/∂tD = ∂D/∂tC = 0. In a framework without environ-
mental externalities, this assumption leads to the well-known inverse elasticity
rule of optimal taxation. Note that cross price eﬀects between the commodities
C and D vanish if the second derivative MCD = MDC := ∂2M/(∂D∂C)o ft h e
function M(C,D) equals zero. In this case, the utility function (12) represents
those preferences which have to be assumed for proper partial equilibrium welfare
analysis. Hence, the following result is based on the same assumptions as have
implicitly been made in the partial equilibrium models of Terkla (1984), Lee and
Misiolek (1986), and Oates (1993).
Proposition 3: Consider the utility function (12) and assume cross price eﬀects
between the commodities C and D to be absent. If tS
C > 0, then (a) GS <G F and
(b) ES >E F ⇔ ∂R/∂tD > 0.
Proof: (a) Since M(C,D) has been assumed to be strictly concave, we have













Because of µ>0 [see the equation (15)] and tC > 0, this condition implies
µ>1/h. Consider now (7). Since the utility function (12) implies UV =1 ,w eh a v e
NUG =1 /h in ﬁrst best. Comparing this condition with (15) (and remembering
that U(·) is strictly concave in G) proves the result.
9(b) I will only prove ⇐. The proof of ⇒ is analogous: We know from the
proof of part (a) that ∂D/∂tD < 0, ∂D/∂tC =0 ,a n dµ>1/h. Hence, as long as
















Now assume that the claim is wrong, i.e. that the inequality ES ≤ EF holds. This
implies DS ≥ DF.S i n c eU(·) is strictly concave in E,a n d∂D/∂tD = ∂D/∂pD <
0, it then follows that (UF
E − US
E) < 0a n d( pS
D − pF
D) < 0. Because of e  < 0a n d
∂D/∂tD < 0, this contradicts (18). Therefore, ES >E F. 
Proposition 3 shows that the crowding-out hypothesis, i.e. the claim that
distortionary taxation reduces the optimal level of public-good provision does
indeed hold for the ordinary public good G. This result follows from comparing
the multiplier µ, i.e. the shadow price of government revenue with the marginal
utility of income 1/h. In the ﬁrst-best optimum, the condition µ =1 /h must
hold. As shown in the proof, we have µ>1/h in second best if and only if
the consumption tax tC is positive. Hence, the welfare cost of increasing public
revenue is higher in second best than in ﬁrst best. Since the optimal amount of G
is decreasing in µ (see the eq. (15)), we thus get GS <G F. The inequality µ>1/h
also means that additional revenue from pollution taxation is more valuable in
the case tC > 0 than with lump-sum taxation. In fact, the pollution tax tD is
higher in second best than in ﬁrst best if and only if (µ−1/h)∂R/∂tD is positive.
Hence, less provision of G in second best is accompanied by more provision of
E (relative to ﬁrst best) if and only if the optimal environmental tax is on the
normal side of the Laﬀer curve for this tax rate. This means that the welfare
gain from reducing ES towards the ﬁrst-best level EF is more than oﬀset by
concomitant revenue losses. Note also, that the condition ∂R/∂tD > 0c o i n c i d e s
with inequality (9) above, used by Fullerton (1997). Hence, if cross price eﬀects
are absent, (9) is necessary and suﬃcient for ES >E F.
It might be worthwhile to point out that the assumptions of Proposition 3
which have implicitly been made in the partial equilibrium literature do not rule
out those of Proposition 1. This can be veriﬁed by means of the following example
where quasilinear preferences (12) are combined with the homogeneous function
M(C,D)=Cα + Dα,0<α<1. This example satisﬁes all assumptions made
in the Propositions 1 and 3. The claim that the diﬀerential between the taxes tD
and tC should be lower in second best than in ﬁrst best can thus be formulated
10within the partial equilibrium model of the earlier literature as well.
So far, I have assumed that cross price eﬀects between the commodities C and
D are negligible. In this case, providing less of the public good corresponds to
providing more environmental quality than in ﬁrst best if and only if the marginal
revenue ∂R/∂tD is positive. If, however, cross price eﬀects are signiﬁcant, the
relationship between environmental quality E and tax revenue R does not only
depend on the sign of ∂R/∂tD, but also on the derivatives ∂R/∂tC and ∂D/∂tC.
In general, this leads to rather complex conditions for provision of E and G.T h e s e
technicalities can be avoided if the demand function D(pC,p D,p L) is assumed to
be convex in prices pC and pD. This assumption contains the linear demand model
which has been analyzed for example by Parry (1995) as a special case.18
Proposition 4: Consider the utility function (12) and assume that the demand
function D(pC,p D,p L) is convex in prices pC and pD.I fGS <G F and ∂R/∂tD >
0,t h e nES >E F.
Proof: Due to the normalization tL =0 ,w eh a v epL = h in ﬁrst best and second





































From the equations (15) and (7), we also know that GS <G F ⇔ µ>1/h.
Applying now the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3 [see part (b)]
proves the result. 
Proposition 4 conﬁrms the main result of Proposition 3: Less provision of G
in second best is accompanied by more provision of E (relative to ﬁrst best) if the
marginal revenue of the pollution tax is positive. This shows that the intuitive
argument provided above is not conﬁned to the partial equilibrium framework,
but is relevant also if cross price eﬀects between the commodities C and D are
taken into account.
18Note that convex demand functions do not rule out homothetic preferences which have been
assumed by Bovenberg and de Mooij. This can easily be veriﬁed by means of the Cobb-Douglas
example M(C,D)=CαDβ.
115 Some Generalization
Still, the Propositions 3 and 4 rely on rather restrictive assumptions. In the
following, I will thus discuss the comparison between the quantities ES and EF






Z): =a r g m i n
C,D,V,E,G
{hV + C + D + G/N | (19)
E = e(ND),U (C,D,V,E,G) ≥ U
S}
which is constructed by minimizing the amount of resources necessary to achieve
the second-best utility level US := U(CS,D S,VS,ES,G S). It can easily be veri-
ﬁed that the allocation (19) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-best Samuelson conditions (6) and
(7) and that it generates the same utility as in second best. Thus, it can be used
to identify the “income eﬀect” of moving from ﬁrst best to second best. In anal-









where (EF − EZ) is the income eﬀect and (EZ − ES) is the substitution eﬀect.
The income eﬀect stems from the fact that the second-best allocation lies on a
lower indiﬀerence surface than the ﬁrst-best allocation, whereas the substitution
eﬀect reﬂects the fact that at least one of the Samuelson conditions (6) and (7)
is violated in second best.
The quasilinear preferences (12) imply EF = EZ and GF = GZ,w h i c hm e a n s
that the income eﬀect is zero for environmental quality E and the ordinary public
good G. Propositions 3 and 4 thus rely on the assumption that an increase in
exogenous income has no eﬀect on the Pareto eﬃcient level of environmental
quality. Note that environmental quality and consumption of the dirty commodity
cannot be increased simultaneously in the present context. In general, the sign of
the income eﬀect EF −EZ thus depends on whether the agents care more about
the environment or about private consumption of the dirty commodity if their
exogenous income is increased. In assuming quasilinear preferences, the previous
analysis in Section 4 takes a neutral position regarding this question. Note that
empirical evidence concerning the income eﬀect in the presence of distortionary
taxation is mixed: Some pollutants decrease with income while others (e.g. CO2
emissions) tend to increase with income (see Arrow et al. (1995) for a discussion).
From a general perspective, income neutrality thus seems to be a reasonable
12assumption. It is clear, however, that the conjecture EF >E Z would generate a
countervailing eﬀect with respect to the analysis presented above.
Consider next the substitution eﬀect EZ − ES, which can be further decom-
posed along the lines of Metcalf (2003). First, remember from Section 3 that tC
and tD are both higher in second best than in ﬁrst best, even as the diﬀerential
between tC and tD is smaller. Then, starting from an initial situation with tD = τ
and tC = 0, an increase in taxation tC and tD leads to a substitution eﬀect away
from consumption of produced commodities C and D towards leisure. Second, as
the tax diﬀerential between tD and tC is reduced, consumers will substitute from
C to D. The leisure substitution eﬀect thus reduces pollution, whereas the com-
modity substitution eﬀect increases pollution. Propositions 3 and 4 show that
the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second, at least within the framework of partial
equilibrium or linear demand, for overall levels of environmental quality.
These ﬁndings are in line with Metcalf (2003) who investigates the eﬀect of a
marginal increase in exogenous government revenue on environmental quality in
second best. Employing the same assumptions as in Proposition 1, he argues that
the leisure substitution eﬀect dominates the commodity substitution eﬀect for
reasonable parameter values. He also points out that the leisure substitution eﬀect
depends on the elasticity of labor supply, whereas the consumption substitution
eﬀect depends on the elasticity of substitution between the commodities C and




α/γ + V + B(G)+H(E), (20)
where 0 <α<1, γ<1, and γ  = 0. In this example, one obtains a constant
elasticity of substitution σ := 1/(1 −γ) and a constant elasticity of labor supply
  := α/(1 − α). Since M(C,D) is homogeneous and  >0, the assumptions of






C +( 1+  −  p
S
C)τ and 1 +  >  p
S
C (21)
must hold in second best where τ := −(NUEe )/λ is the social marginal damage





C <τ and p
S
D >τ+ 1 (22)
provided that pS
C > 1,  >0a n d1>  τ . Note that the ﬁrst and the second
inequality in (22) are equivalent to the inequalities in (10) and (11) respectively.
13They indicate that both prices pC and pD are higher in second best than in ﬁrst
best, but that the price diﬀerential pD − pC is lower. A simultaneous increase in
pC and pD induces the leisure substitution eﬀect, while a reduction of pD − pC
leads to the commodity substitution eﬀect. With respect to the example (20),

















Using (21), (22), and (23), it can be shown that the inequalities
σ ≤ (1 +  )+
1 −  τ
τ
and σ ≥ (1 +  )+2
1 −  τ
τ
(1 +  ) (24)
are suﬃcient for ES >E F and ES <E F respectively.19 Metcalf (2003) considers
parameter values σ ∈{ 0.5,1.0,2.0} and   ∈{ 0.15,0.30,0.45} where σ =1a n d
  =0 .30 is taken as the most plausible case. Using (23), it can easily be demon-
strated that the cross price eﬀect ∂D/∂pC is negative if and only if σ<1+ .I n
this case, the demand for the dirty commodity is decreasing in tD and tC such
that environmental quality is higher in second best than in ﬁrst best.20 Therefore,
to obtain the opposite result (ES <E F), a positive cross price eﬀect ∂D/∂pC
(i.e. σ>1+ ) is necessary. In this case, the taxes tC and tD have opposing
eﬀects on the demand for the dirty commodity D. Hence, environmental quality
increases with government revenue from taxing dirty consumption and decreases
with government revenue from taxing clean consumption. The sign of the total
eﬀect depends on the parameters σ, , and the marginal damage τ. Using the sec-
ond inequality in (24), examples with ES <E F can easily be constructed even
if the marginal revenue from environmental taxation is positive.21 However, such
examples require either a high elasticity of substitution σ or a high environmen-
tal tax tS
D.22 Hence, even though the Pigouvian tax increment pS
D − pS
C is below
the marginal damage τ, rather strong assumptions have to be made in order to
obtain a lower level of environmental quality in second best than in ﬁrst best.
19Since quasilinear preferences imply a zero income eﬀect EF − EZ, the diﬀerence EF − ES
equals the substitution eﬀect EZ − ES.
20The property ∂D/∂pC < 0 ⇔ σ<1+  holds generally under the assumptions of
Proposition 1. This explains why Metcalf ﬁnds a dominating (local) leisure substitution eﬀect
for parameters σ =0 .5a n dσ =1 .
21It can also be shown that the utility function (20) implies GS <G F.W et h u so b t a i nl e s s
provision of both E and G in second best than in ﬁrst best.
22Consider for example the case tS
D < 1 analyzed in Metcalf (2003). Because of tS
D >τ ,t h e
ﬁrst inequality in (24) then implies that ES <E F can hold only if σ>2.
146 Concluding Remarks
This paper complements earlier contributions on environmental taxation by in-
vestigating allocations instead of prices. I concentrate on the question whether
the second-best provision level of a collective good is below or above the cor-
responding quantity in the ﬁrst-best optimum. Assuming certain restrictions on
utility, it is shown that less provision of ordinary public goods in second best is
accompanied by more provision of environmental quality (relative to ﬁrst best)
provided that the marginal revenue of environmental taxation is positive. This
ﬁnding conﬁrms the idea that the shadow price of the tax revenue from environ-
mental protection is higher in a second-best setting than in a framework where
public expenditures can be ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation. Of course, the re-
sults are restricted to the rather speciﬁc assumptions made above. In fact, it is
also shown that counterexamples can be constructed with less provision of both
E and G in second best even though the marginal revenue ∂R/∂tD is positive.
However, the results make clear that high costs of public funds can serve as a
justiﬁcation for improving environmental quality under reasonable assumptions.
Moreover, the single market analysis of Terkla (1984), Lee and Misiolek (1986),
and Oates (1993) is shown to be correct as long as it is interpreted with respect
to the optimal quantity E, and not with respect to the diﬀerential between the
tax rates tD and tC.
Note, however, that the present analysis is based on a model where the en-
vironmental quality E can only be enhanced by taxing the consumption of the
dirty commodity ND. This framework could be generalized along the lines of
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994). They assume E to be a function of ND
and a public abatement activity A, i.e. E = e(ND,A), where ∂e/∂(ND) < 0a n d
∂e/∂A > 0. Taking the expenditures A into account, the government’s budget
constraint has to be modiﬁed such that tCC + tDD + tLh(1 − V )+G + A =0 .
In this setting, the government can ‘provide’ environmental quality in two dif-
ferent ways. First, by taxing D and raising revenue, second by increasing A and
raising expenditures. With respect to the second option, environmental quality is
analogous to ordinary public consumption. Hence, if we consider the special case
∂e/∂(ND) = 0 which means more environmental quality only through abate-
ment, then under-provision of the public good G implies under-provision of E
and vice versa. This means that the introduction of abatement activities has a
countervailing eﬀect on the ﬁndings explored above. Indeed, it is easy to construct
15examples of this generalized model where both under-provision and over-provision
may occur depending on the productivity of the abatement technology.
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